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Abstract
Spectrum regulation necessarily involves some regulation of the
technology that licensees can use. One commonly stated assertion
is that a mandated single standard, the solution followed by the EU
for 2G wireless, is a successful model for spectrum regulation. We ar-
gue that a single standard leads to a free riding problem, and thus to
a significant decrease in marginal incentives for R&D investment. In
this context, keeping two separate standards may be a necessary evil to
sustain a high level of R&D expenditures. We also provide conditions
such that a non-standardization equilibrium is better for consumers
and for society as a whole.
∗Cabral: lcabral@stern.nyu.edu. Salant: dsalant@gmail.com. We are grateful to Jorge
Padilla, Vasco Santos, and various seminar participants for useful comments and sugges-
tions. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 Introduction
Spectrum regulation necessarily involves some regulation of the technol-
ogy that licensees can use. Beginning in the early 1990’s, the US Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), as well as regulatory agencies in other
countries, have taken an increasingly laissez-faire approach to determining
standards for wireless communications. For the Personal Communications
Services (PCS) spectrum auctions, the FCC, as well as Industry Canada
and the Mexican CFT, all allowed winning bidders to deploy any technol-
ogy compatible with the band plan, power and emissions restrictions. At
one point there were 2G technologies with virtually nationwide coverage in
the US. In contrast, Europe, mandated that all firms allocated 2G spectrum
licenses deploy only the GSM technology. For 3G, there were two main
technologies deployed. However, despite significant pressure from the US
government and from US firms, the EU mandated a single 3G standard.
The EU seems to be taking a similar approach toward mobile television.
One commonly stated assertion is that the EU mandate of a single stan-
dard is a very successful model for spectrum regulation. However, economic
analysis of this assertion is limited, and neither theory nor econometric ev-
idence provide unambiguous support for it. The purpose of this paper is to
formally examine the claim that standards regulation is welfare enhancing.
We develop a model featuring non-cooperative R&D competition and coop-
erative standard setting. Contrary to the above view, we find that, under
some circumstances, standards competition results in higher consumer sur-
plus and social welfare than mandated standards. Moreover, market based
standards generally result in faster innovation than standards regulation.
More specifically, we consider a world in which the relative quality of
each standard evolves over time as a result of each firm’s R&D expenditure.
We argue that standardization — at least early standardization — leads to a
free riding problem, and thus to a significant decrease in marginal incentives
for R&D investment. In this context, keeping two separate standards may
be a necessary evil to sustain a high level of R&D expenditures. Specifically,
we consider a model such that myopic firms would always agree to standard-
ization; but considering the dynamics of product innovation, in equilibrium
firms opt for developing their own standard. We also provide conditions
such that a non-standardization equilibrium is socially optimal.
Related literature. Several authors have dealt with the the economic
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analysis of standard setting. Perhaps closest to our paper, Choi (1996)
considers the trade-off between the short-run benefits from standardization
and the long-run benefits from experimenting with different technologies.
Under certain conditions, he finds that ex post standardization is optimal
(as is the case in our paper).
Nisvan and Minehart (2007) present a multi-period model of R&D with
the possibility of firms sharing technology. Their setup is different from
ours (for example, no profits are earned until all n steps of R&D are suc-
cessfully completed; and the possibility of firm exit is explicitly considered).
Moreover, their focus is also somewhat different (less on the benefits from
standardization, more on the costs of product market collusion).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline some of the
main milestones in the history of wireless telephony, with an emphasis on
the process of standard setting and the persistent lack of a single standard.
In Section 3, we introduce a model of R&D and standards setting and the
main result of our paper: there are situations when, despite costless bar-
gaining and market benefits from standardization, the equilibrium features
multiple, incompatible standards. Section 4 extends the analysis to consider
social welfare. We provide conditions such that an equilibrium with multiple
standards is socially optimal. Section 5 provides a discussion of the main
results and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 History of wireless standards competition
Wireless telecommunications have a long history of standardization issues.
First generation (1G) wireless mobile voice (and data) communications came
under two different standards: Analog Mobile Phone System (AMPS) and
the Nordic Mobile System (NMTS). AMPS was the mandatory North Amer-
ican standard. Most of the rest of the world, including Europe, was split
between AMPS and NMTS (Gandal, Salant, and Waverman, 2003).
Starting in the early 1980s, four different second generation (2G) stan-
dards were introduced: GSM (often called Global System for Mobile Com-
munications); TDMA (time division multiple access); iDEN; and CDMA
(code division multiple access). GSM, TDMA and iDEN all divide a carrier
channel into time slots, and digitally encode the signal on the time slots;
they differ in the time division protocols used. CDMA, the latest standard
to be developed, can usually pack more bits, or voice calls, into a given
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amount of spectrum than can GSM or TDMA.1
The European Union delegated standard setting to the European Techni-
cal Standards Institute (ETSI), which mandated GSM. In contrast, the FCC
in the U.S. and regulators in other countries, including Australia, China In-
dia, and various South American countries have allowed operators to select
their own standards based on economic or whatever criteria they wanted
(Gandal, Salant, and Waverman, 2003; Cabral and Kretschmer, 2006). As a
result, virtually all 2G networks in Europe are GSM, while elsewhere either
the European policy was followed or there are competing standards. In the
U.S., for example, GSM was the first 2G standard deployed (by Sprint in
Washington, DC). TDMA and CDMA were introduced shortly thereafter
(the latter by Sprint, GTE, Primeco, Bell Atlantic-NYNEX (all but Sprint
are now part of Verizon Wireless) and Ameritech, among others).
At an early point of the development of third generation wireless (3G),
there was a tentative accord for a single 3G standard. However, a number
of European equipment vendors who dominated ETSI (namely Ericsson,
Nokia and Siemens) decided on a variation of the original 3G standard,
CDMA2000, which was developed by QUALCOMM. As ETSI sets stan-
dards policy for spectrum in the EU, European operators adopted a slight
variation of the CDMA2000 standard, namely WCDMA.2 We thus have two
3G standards: CDMA2000 (or CDMA1X), created by QUALCOMM; and
WCDMA, the ETSI derived standard.
CDMA2000 is essentially an upgrade of second generation CDMA and
is largely backwards compatible. WCDMA (also called UMTS) is a vari-
ation of the CDMA2000 standard. It is essentially incompatible with ei-
ther CDMA2000 or second generation CDMA (Salant and Waverman, 1998,
1999). What we mean by incompatible is that handsets meant to work on
one standard will not easily work on the other one. In addition, 2G CDMA
operators can easily upgrade to CDMA2000, merely by replacing some ra-
dio equipment at base stations and upgrading the software in the switches.
By contrast, 2G CDMA operators cannot easily upgrade to WCDMA. Fi-
nally, for GSM operators the cost of upgrading to CDMA2000 or WCDMA
1. iDEN was deployed specifically for refarming narrow slivers of spectrum previously
used for trunk radio service.
2. The U.S. was able to successfully lobby the EU to reverse the decision to require
all European Union national regulatory agencies (NRAs) to require the ETSI man-
dated standard (as this would be a violation of a US/EU competition policy treaty).
However, the EU NRAs allocated frequency in a way that makes it difficult for any-
one to deploy CDMA2000; and in fact no firm has done so in the 3G bands.
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is about the same.
From a non-traveling-user point of view, the costs of multiple incompat-
ible standards may not be very significant. In fact, every user has universal
access to other users, regardless of which network they are connected to.
There may be connection charges, but these result from there being more
than one network, not from there being more than one standard. A trav-
eling user may incur additional costs insofar as roaming may be limited.
For example, a U.S. user with a CDMA or CDMA2000 handset will not be
able to use it in Europe. However, many GSM handsets that are sold to
European users can also be used in the U.S.
The costs of multiple standards would then seem to be primarily borne
out by operators and equipment manufacturers. For example, the market
for GSM handsets and terminal equipment is greater than that for CDMA
based equipment, allowing for greater economies of scale in the former. For
a chipset manufacturer like QUALCOMM, lack of standardization in 3G
implies additional costs for various reasons: in addition to the loss of scale
economies, a portion of its CDMA software must be re-written to work in
WCDMA.
The above history of the wireless telecommunications industry leads to
the puzzling question which motivates our analysis: If multiple standards
create additional costs (for equipment manufacturers, operators and users),
then why don’t we observe an agreement on a single standard? Why the
secession by Ericsson, Nokia and Siemens, which seems counter to the lock-in
predicted by typical models of standards setting? One possible answer relies
on the inefficiencies of negotiations among multiple players with possibly
conflicting goals. In this paper, we argue that lack of standardization may
be the natural outcome of competition even in a world with no inefficiencies
in negotiations (Section 3); and may in fact be the socially optimal outcome
(Section 4).
3 Model and equilibrium results
Consider an infinite horizon duopoly in an industry with an evolving tech-
nology. Specifically, suppose a technology can be at two different levels:
0,1.3 The horizon is divided into discrete periods, each of which is divided
3. In terms of our wireless story, we can interpret level 0 as 2G and level 1 as 3G.
Later, we may want to consider the extension to three levels, which is not trivial
and adds some new elements.
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Figure 1: State space and transition paths. Solid arrows represent transi-
tions by means of innovation outcomes. Dashed arrows represent transitions
by means of standardization agreements.
into three stages. In a first stage, firms decide whether to make their tech-
nology designs compatible. In a second stage, firms independently make an
R&D investment towards improving their technology. Specifically, in order
to innovate with probability ρ a firm must spend 12 ρ
2.4 Finally, in a third
stage product market profits for the period are received.
In each period, the state of the game can be described by two elements:
the status of standardization and the technology level. Suppose that stan-
dardization has not yet been achieved. Then the sate of the game is sum-
marized by the technology level of each firm. We then denote the state
by D(i, j), where D stands for dual standards. If standardization has been
achieved, then the state of the game is given by S(i), where S stands for
single standard and i is the (common) technology level.5
Figure 1 summarizes the state space. Each rectangle represents a state.
States with two numbers (left-hand side of the figure) represent dual stan-
dard states; states with one number (right-hand side of the figure) repre-
sent single standard states. Solid arrows represent transitions by means
of innovation outcomes. Dashed arrows represent transitions by means of
standardization agreements. Our assumptions regarding transition between
states are formalized as follows:
Assumption 1 (i) Starting from state D(i, j), an improvement in firm i’s
technology leads to state D(i + 1, j). (ii) Starting from state S(i), an im-
4. Naturally, if a firm is at technology level 1 it will not spend any resources on
innovation.
5. To be rigorous, the state of the game must also include an indication of what part
of the period is being played, in particular, whether standard negotiations have
taken place. However, it should be clear from the context what particular moment
we are considering.
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provement in any firm’s technology leads to state S(i+1). (iii) Starting from
state D(i, j), a standardization agreement leads to state S(max{i, j}).
We thus consider two forms of state transitions. The first one is R&D,
and it works according to Assumption 1 (i) and (ii). The second form of
state transition corresponds to standardization agreements, and it works
according to Assumption 1 (iii).6 Notice that technology transitions take
one period, whereas standardization agreements are instantaneous.
Having defined the state of the game, we now let VD(i, j) and VS(i) be
firm i’s value function (in a state with dual and single standard, respec-
tively). That is, these are the value functions for the firm whose technology
is at level i. Let piD(i, j), piS(i) be the corresponding per-period product
market profit functions.
Our next assumption relates to the nature of the standardization pro-
cess. Whereas R&D effort choices are independently and non-cooperatively
chosen, we assume the standardization process consists of a negotiation be-
tween the firms. Specifically, we assume efficient, equal-split bargaining:7
Assumption 2 If standardization is efficient, that is, if 2VS(max{i, j}) >
VD(i, j)+VD(j, i), then standardization takes place and the gains are equally
split between the firms.
Our final assumption relates to the profit functions:
Assumption 3 (a) piS(i) > piD(i, i), i = 0, 1; (b) 2piS(1) > piD(1, 0) +
piD(0, 1).
This implies that, at every possible state, product market industry profits
are greater with standardization than without.
Before proceeding, it is worthwhile restating our basic assumptions. A
critical part of Assumption 1 is that standardization is an “absorbing” state.
That is, once firm agree on a standard, then whatever improvements are
achieved to that standards are shared by both firms, that, both firms con-
tinue to own the common standard. This assumption play a crucial role in
our results. Assumptions 2 and 3 are made primarily for expositional pur-
poses. In fact, they stack the cards in favor of standardization (bargaining
6. Notice that we only consider two levels of technology development. Therefore,
Definition 1 really only applies to i = 0. Alternatively, we make the convention
that state D(i, j) is equivalent to stage D(1, j) when i > 1 (and the same for S(i).)
7. To justify this, suppose that firms make alternating offers and that the time interval
between offers in negligible. Rubinstein’s (1982) result then implies our assumption.
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is efficient, standardization increases product market profits). By making
these assumptions, it is easier to understand the nature of our result, namely
that standardization may not take place in equilibrium.
Our first result in this section refers to the equilibrium level of R&D
effort:
Proposition 1 The equilibrium levels of R&D are lower when standardiza-
tion takes place. Specifically, ρi and ρj are higher in state D(i, j) than in
state S(max{i, j}).
The proof of this and other results in the paper may be found in the Ap-
pendix. Here we present the main intuition. An important step in the proof
is to show that
VD(1, 0) > VS(1) > VD(0, 1).
Even though in equilibrium state D(0, 1) leads to state S(1), that is, firms
agree on a common standard, the ex-ante payoff is greater for the firm that
owns the superior technology. This in turn implies that innovation incentives
when both firms are at technology level 0 are different whether there is one
standard or two standards. Consider the case when firm i’s rival does not
innovate. Then the the marginal gain from innovation by firm i is greater
under dual standards by VD(1, 0) − VS(1). If firm i’s rival does innovate,
then the extra marginal gain is given by VS(1) − VD(0, 1). Either way, the
marginal gain is greater under no standardization.
Intuitively, under standardization any marginal improvement created by
firm i is available both to i and its rival. This creates a free-riding problem
(a positive externality on firm j). More importantly, it implies a private
bad for firm i: it suffers directly from the fact that firm j improves along
with firm i. Assumption 1(ii) thus plays a crucial role in Proposition 1.
Even though firms continue to choose innovation effort independently, under
standardization the benefits from innovation are equally shared by both
firms.
The externality created by standardization suggests that firms may pre-
fer not to standardize as a way to internalize innovation incentives. Our
next result provides sufficient conditions for this to happen.
Proposition 2 Suppose that piS(0) − piD(0, 0) and piD(1, 0) − piD(0, 1) are
small. Then standardization occurs in all states D(i, j) except D(0, 0).
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Figure 2: State space and transition paths observed along the equilibrium
path (with positive probability).
It may seem surprising at first how general Proposition 1 is, whereas
Proposition 2 requires several parameter assumptions (which however are
sufficient, not necessary conditions). As mentioned above, standardization
implies an externality: a benefit conferred on the rival firm. However, com-
petitive R&D implies itself an externality: part of the gain obtained by firm
i is gotten at the expense of firm j. Therefore, the fact that lack of stan-
dardization leads to higher levels of innovative effort (Proposition 1) does
not necessarily imply that it is preferred by firms. Proposition 2 sets out a
set of sufficient conditions such that the effect in Proposition 1 leads firms
to agree not to standardize. The assumption that piS(1) − piS(0) is large
may be interpreted as meaning that innovation is valuable. The assumption
that piS(0) − piD(0, 0) is small ensures that the short-term loss from lack
of standardization is not too large. Finally, the assumption that δ is small
implies that equilibrium ρ is small and thus the business stealing effect is
small.
Figure 2 summarizes Proposition 2. Specifically, it shows all transitions
that are observed along the equilibrium path with positive probability. Since
the game starts from state D(0, 0), we see that state S(0) is never visited.
As soon as one of the firms achieves level 1, standardization ensues.
4 Social welfare
Propositions 1 and 2 are about positive analysis. They provide conditions
under which standardization does not take place in state (0,0) even though
firms’ profits would be greater in every state if firms were to standardize.
From the firms’ point of view, the short-term losses from lack of standard-
ization are more than compensated by longer-term benefits of higher levels
of R&D expenditure. In fact, from the firms’ point of view the equilibrium
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pattern of standardization is optimal.
In order to go from industry profits to social welfare we need a more
detailed model of product market competition and consumer welfare. Inso-
far as consumer welfare and industry profits are relatively aligned regarding
standardization decisions, Proposition 2 can be extended to state that no
standardization at stage (0,0) is socially optimal. Whether this is true de-
pends on the particular model we have in mind. In what follows, we present
a particular model that we believe reasonably reflects some of the features
of wireless communications.
Looking at the current situation of wireless communications in the U.S.,
we note that lack of standardization regarding the basic technology does
not prevent consumers from benefiting from network effects: every consumer
can communicate with every other consumer, regardless of which technology
they are hooked up to. Lack of standardization can imply higher costs for
sellers, who have to create means of hooking up networks based on different
technologies. To the extent that these higher costs are reflected on prices,
consumers are worse off. In other words, it seems fair to say that, when it
comes to standardization, the main concern for consumers is prices rather
than network effects.8
To be more specific, consider a Hotelling type duopoly where each firm
is located at the extreme of a product variety segment and consumers are
uniformly distributed along that segment (each consumer buys one unit
from one of the sellers). If the sellers’ technologies are not standardized,
then both their fixed costs and their marginal costs must increase in order
to provide consumers with universal network access. Let k0, c0 and k1, c1
be the sellers’ fixed and marginal cost with and without standardization.
Assume that k0 > k1 and c0 > c1. This is consistent with Assumption 3,
namely that industry profits are greater under standardization. Specifically,
equilibrium firm profits are given by
pi =
1
2
t− ki (i = 1, 2),
8. A single standard, can, but need not, provide consumers with better coverage,
especially during the roll-out phase. The anecdotal evidence contrasting European
and North American experience, without controlling for differences in dates of
spectrum allocations and population density, suggests that coverage was better in
Europe. However, firms offering competing standards can have stronger incentives
to compete in coverage than those offering the same technology.
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whereas consumer surplus is given by
µ = v − t− ci (i = 1, 2),
where v is consumer valuation and t is the “transportation” cost.
Our main result in this section is that, if sellers’ and buyers’ incentives
are properly aligned as regards the standardization decision, then the no-
standardization equilibrium result from Proposition 2 can be extended to
social welfare.
Proposition 3 If c1 − c0 is sufficiently small, then if in equilibrium there
is no standardization in state (0, 0) it follows that no standardization is the
socially optimal outcome in that state.
5 Discussion
Our main result, Proposition 2, states that if the gains from innovation
are significant and the short run benefits from standardization relatively
small, then in equilibrium firms prefer to follow different paths in their R&D
efforts. What does this have to say regarding wireless telecommunications,
the main motivating example we consider in this paper? We can think
of third generation as our level zero technology and R&D as the effort to
reach 4G. From a short run point of view, it might seem more efficient for
Qualcomm and Nokia to agree on a common standard of 3G, that is, to move
to state S(0). As it happened, the state remained at D(0, 0), with WCDMA
and CDMA2000 representing each of the 0’s. Many may lament this as an
inefficient equilibrium resulting from inefficiencies in negotiations. We argue
that, given the incompleteness of contracts involving IP, dual standards may
have the benefit of maintaining research incentives that might otherwise be
inefficiently diminished.
We take a somewhat extreme approach by assuming that, under stan-
dardization, all technology improvements are shared by the adherents to that
standard; whereas, under dual standards, imitation is only possible under
a standardization agreement. Reality is probably between these extremes.
But to the extent that standardization increases the free-riding problem of
R&D effort, our qualitative result still holds.
We consider a simple framework with two technology levels, 0 and 1. But
before 3G there as 2G; and after 4G there will likely be 5G. We could con-
sider a more general framework with an infinite technology ladder. Suppose
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that, in addition to standardization, firms may write license agreements.
Our conjecture is that, each time a firm gets one step ahead of its rival,
the laggard will license the technology from the leader but not follow the
same standard. We then reach state D(1, 1), which effectively becomes the
new state D(0, 0). Technology licensing then has the benefits of (efficiently)
bringing all firms to a higher technology level without imposing the free-
riding inefficiencies of standardization.
Our assumptions regarding short-run profits purposely stack the cards
in favor of standardization (that is, in each period, profits under a single
standard are greater than under dual standards). The same is not necessarily
true regarding our assumption of efficient negotiations. If negotiation costs
are prohibitively high, then trivially there is no standardization agreement.
However, intermediate levels of negotiations costs may or may not favor
standardization. If the cost is uniform across all possible instances, then
negotiations costs favor no standardization to the extent that they delay
the cost from standard setting negotiations. Specifically, VS(0) is decreased
by N , the negotiation cost, whereas VD(0, 0) is decreased by δ N . If N
is large and δ small, this may switch the equilibrium from standardization
to delayed standardization. However, it might be argued that the costs of
reaching an agreement are higher when firms’ technology levels are different
than when they’re equal. In that case, negotiations costs might favor early
standardization. Specifically, VS(0) is decreased by NS , whereas VD(0, 0) is
decreased by (1 − ρ2)NA + ρ2NS , where NS is the negotiation cost when
both firms are at the same technology level and NA is the negotiation cost
when firms are at different technology levels. If the difference between NS
and NA is sufficiently large, then the equilibrium may switch from delayed
standardization to standardization in state (0, 0).
6 Conclusion
Our analysis indicates that a regulatory policy mandating a single standard
can, at times, be harmful, both from a consumer and from social point
of view. We provide a set of conditions such that, absent regulation, firms
choose incompatible technologies. In this context, regulatory policy mandat-
ing compatible standards reduces investment incentives, retards innovation,
and may ultimately reduce consumer and social welfare.
Our model suggests that the relation between standardization and inno-
vation incentives is relatively robust. By contrast, the relation between a
11
mandated standard and consumer welfare depends on various crucial param-
eters. If the consumer loss from multiple standards is sufficiently large, and
if firm profits are not well aligned with consumer welfare, then a mandated
standard may increase consumer welfare.
Finally, while our paper was motivated by the wireless telecommunica-
tions industry, we believe the problems we highlight are of more general
importance. For example, the EU recently decided on a standard for mo-
bile TV. On March 17, 2008, Viviane Reding, EU Commissioner for the
Information Society and Media, stated that
For Mobile TV to take off in Europe, there must first be cer-
tainty about the technology. This is why I am glad that with
today’s decision, taken by the Commission in close coordination
with the Member States and the European Parliament, the EU
endorse DVB-H as the preferred technology for terrestrial mobile
broadcasting.9
While we cannot claim the EU’s decision to be right or wrong in the present
context, we challenge the assertion that a mandated standard is in general
the best solution.
9. See http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/451&format=
HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, visited on April 7, 2008.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose we are in state D(1, 1), that is, both
firms are at technology level 1 and each has its own standard. If firms do
not agree on a common standard, then product market profits are piD(1, 1)
for each. If they agree on a common standard, then product market profits
are piS(1) for each. Assumption 3 then implies that at state (1, 1) firms
agree on a common standard. In fact, there is no additional R&D and so
product market profits is all that matters; and, by assumption, we have
efficient bargaining, which leads to the efficient solution (from the firms’
perspective). We thus have
VD(1, 1) = VS(1) =
piS(1)
1− δ , (1)
where δ is the discount factor. Now suppose we are in state D(1, 0). Since
firms can achieve the same industry payoffs as in state S(1), and given
Assumptions 2 and 3, we again conclude that firms choose standardization.
We thus have VD(0, 1)+VD(1, 0) = 2VS(1). The exact split of the pie 2VS(1)
depends on the outside option for each firm, which we consider next.
Let V˜D(0, 1) and V˜D(1, 0) denote the value function corresponding to a
one-time deviation from the equilibrium path whereby firms do not agree on
a common standard. That is, V˜D(0, 1) corresponds to the outside option in
the standardization negotiations. We then have
V˜D(0, 1) = piD(0, 1) + δ
(
ρ
piS(1)
1− δ + (1− ρ)VD(0, 1)
)
− 1
2
ρ2. (2)
V˜D(1, 0) = piD(1, 0) + δ
(
ρ
piS(1)
1− δ + (1− ρ)VD(1, 0)
)
. (3)
(Recall that the leading firm chooses zero research effort.)
We are now ready to analyze the negotiation game at stage D(0, 1). If
there is standardization, then each firm gets piS(1). If negotiations break
down, then firms get V˜D(0, 1) and V˜D(1, 0). We then have
VD(0, 1) + VD(1, 0) = 2VS(1) (4)
VD(0, 1)− V˜D(0, 1) = VD(1, 0)− V˜D(1, 0) (5)
The first equation follows from Assumption 2 (efficient bargaining) and As-
sumption 3 (standardization increases joint profits). The second equation
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states that the gains from standardization are equally split between the two
firms (again by Assumption 2). Solving the above system of equations, we
get
VD(0, 1) = VS(1)−∆
VD(1, 0) = VS(1) + ∆.
where
∆ ≡ V˜D(1, 0)− V˜D(0, 1)
Subtracting (2) from (3) and simplifying, we get
∆ =
(
δ (1− ρ)
)−1 (
piD(1, 0)− piD(0, 1) + 12 ρ
2
)
> 0.
Together with (4), this implies that
VD(0, 1) > VS(1) > VD(0, 1). (6)
Let us now consider state D(0, 0) and and suppose firms decide to standard-
ize. Then each firm maximizes
VS(0) = piS(0)+ δ
(
(1− ρ) (1− ρ˜)VS(0) +
(
1− (1− ρ) (1− ρ˜)
)
VS(1)
)
−1
2
ρ2,
(7)
where ρ˜ is the rival’s R&D effort. (Recall that we make the assumption
that, if firms agree on a standard, then all future technology improvements
are shared.) Suppose instead that firms decide not to standardize. Then
each firm maximizes
VD(0, 0) = piD(0, 0) + δ
(
(1− ρ) (1− ρ˜)VD(0, 0) + ρ (1− ρ˜)VD(1, 0) +
+ (1− ρ) ρ˜ VD(0, 1) + ρ ρ˜ VD(1, 1)
)
− 1
2
ρ2. (8)
Define
Φ ≡
(
δ
(
1− δ (1− ρ) (1− ρ˜)
))−1 (∂ VD(0, 0)
∂ ρ
− ∂ VS(0)
∂ ρ
)
.
Taking into account that VD(1, 1) = VS(1), computation establishes that
Φ = (1− ρ˜)
(
VD(1, 0)− VD(1, 1)
)
+ ρ˜
(
VD(1, 1)− VD(0, 1)
)
> 0,
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since, by (6), VD(1, 0)− VD(1, 1) > 0 and VD(1, 1)− VD(0, 1) > 0. It follows
that the value of ρ is greater under no standardization than under standard-
ization.
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider a hypothetical equilibrium where firms
agree to a common standard at (0,0). From (7), we see that, at a symmetric
equilibrium, the derivative of firm value with respect to effort is given by
∂ VS(0)
∂ ρ
= (1− ρ)
(
VS(1)− VS(0)
)
− ρ
The increase in firm value following a joint increase in effort is in turn given
by
∂ VS(0)
∂ ρ
= 2 (1− ρ)
(
VS(1)− VS(0)
)
− ρ
which is greater. In words, we have the classic free-rider problem whereby
equilibrium effort is (strictly) less than jointly efficient level.
Consider now a one-time deviation whereby firms do not agree on a
standard at (0,0) in the current period. (That is, if none of the firms succeeds
in the current period, then next period firms agree on a common standard
even though we are still in state (0,0).)
If firms fail to agree on a standard, then each firm will be maximizing
V ◦D(0, 0) = piD(0, 0) + δ
(
(1− ρ) (1− ρ˜)VS(0) + ρ (1− ρ˜)VD(1, 0)+
+ (1− ρ) ρ˜ VD(0, 1) + ρ ρ˜ VD(1, 1)
)
− 1
2
ρ2. (9)
If piS(0) is close to piD(0, 0), then the difference in discounted payoff be-
tween standardization and no standardization at (0,0) results from differ-
ences in the value of ρ. If moreover, piD(0, 1) is close to piD(1, 0), then
VD(0, 1) ≈ VD(1, 0) ≈ VS(1), and the equilibrium value of ρ is approxi-
mately the same as the equilibrium value resulting from (7). In words, no
standardization implies a small increase in the value of ρ (we know it’s an
increase by Proposition 1).
Finally, by the argument at the beginning of the proof, an increase in re-
search effort increases the value of firms. Since bargaining is efficient, firms
will agree on not having a common standard, thus increasing each firm’s
payoff.
15
Proof of Proposition 3: If c1 − c0 is sufficiently close to zero, then most
of the cost of providing connection under no standardization is borne out
by sellers. Since we assume efficient bargaining between sellers, the equilib-
rium outcome is optimal from the sellers’ point of view, which in turn is a
sufficient condition for it to be better from a social point of view.
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